Mechanism design theory, introduced by 2007 Nobel laureates Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson, has guided economic institutions worldwide to achieve desirable goals in allocating scarce resources. However, literature on mechanism design that guides its application requests a trustworthy third party. In reality, we regret to see that mutually beneficial transactions fail to happen due to trust issues, and social welfare cannot achieve its full potential. Blockchain technology is claimed to be the trust machine in cyberspace that could replace trustworthy third parties with tamper-proof algorithms. However, literature on blockchain as trust mechanism design is still absent. This project explores how blockchain advances mechanism design through interdisciplinary methods, including theoretical modeling, algorithmic computing, and data analysis. Our application scenario covers automated mechanisms in general, with voting and auction mechanism in particular.
[A Blockchain-based Decentralized Cloud Storage with“Keeper-and-Distributor” Systems]
[Supply Chain Finance Risk Identification and the Corrective Role of the Blockchain]
[Blockchain, Law, and Economics: the AMA Interview for Mr. Lee Reiners]